Abstract: The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan” are a pair of Buddhist philosophical concepts often used to designate two diametrically opposed forms of rhetoric. The former term constitutes its affirmative statement, while the latter defines a fact in negative terms—known in Christian theology as cataphatic and apophatic uses of language, respectively. Looking at the terms for which biaoquan and zhequan initially served as trans lations, especially in Xuanzang’s works, it would seem that these two concepts have not always ap peared as arelated pair representing the above‑mentioned affirmative–negative dichotomy. The for mer could designate both affirmation (*vidhi) as well as the general activity of speech, syllables, and words (nāma). In the case of zhequan, it corresponds, in different texts, to the three Indian Buddhist concepts of negation (*pratiṣedha, *vyāvṛtti, *nivṛtti), implicative negation (paryudāsa), and exclusion of others (anyāpoha), with each use of the term “zhequan” carrying a different set of meanings and associated doctrines. Indeed, in various texts, the concept of zhequan might be opposed to the con cept of biaoquan (*vidhi *sadhana) or opposed to pure negation (prasajya), or it might be applied on its own with no opposing concept. However, as Chinese Buddhism continued to develop throughout the Tang, biaoquan and zhequan came to be firmly associated and popularized as a pair of opposites. Looking at the doctrinal as well as the translation history of these two terms, this paper focuses on how they were used as a pair of opposing philosophical concepts, followed by an analysis of the profound influence of these two concepts on Chinese Buddhism.
Keywords: biaoquan; zhequan; Chinese Buddhism; Xuanzang
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