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## Some Amendments to the New Critical Edition of *Prasannapadā* Chapter One

WANG Junqi

*Prasannapadā* Chapter One is well-known for its author Candrakīrti's justifications for Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* argumentative method and his severe criticisms toward Bhāviveka's *svatantrānumāna*. This chapter of PsP has been repeatedly examined since its publication by Louis de La Vallée Poussin over 1903–1913 (PsP<sub>L</sub>). But owing to the lacunae in the manuscripts Poussin relied on, PsP<sub>L</sub> contains many controversial passages. Currently, the new critical edition published by Anne MacDonald in 2015 (PsP<sub>M</sub>) provided an improved reading of the whole chapter, whereas still there is left the task of amendment. This paper, hereby, ahead of a forthcoming corrigendum of the whole PsP<sub>M</sub>, aims to show several possible amendments to § 27 and § 28 in particular which have already caused a series of debates among scholars, like Hopkins (1983), Tanji (1988), MacDonald (2000; 2003), Oetke (2003), Yonezawa (2004), Matsumoto (2011) and so on.

### Some amendments to § 27

§ 27 (A) *yadā caivaṃ svatantrānumānānabhīdhāyitvaṃ mādhyamikasya, tadā kuto nādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpannānīti svatantrā pratijñā, yasyāṃ sāmukhyāḥ pratyavasthāsyante,*

§ 27 (B) *ko 'yaṃ pratijñārthaḥ | kiṃ kāryātmakaḥ svata uta kāraṇātmaka iti | kiṃ cātaḥ | kāryātmakaś cet siddhasāadhanam | kāraṇātmakaś ced viruddhārthatā, kāraṇātmanā vidyamānasyaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāt || PP*

§ 27 (C) *kuto 'smākaṃ vidyamānatvād iti hetuḥ, yasya siddhasāadhanam viruddhārthatā vā syāt, yasya siddhasāadhanasya yasyāś ca viruddhārthatāyāḥ parihārārtham yatnaṃ kariṣyāmaḥ | tasmāt paroktadoṣāprasaṅgād eva tatparihāra ācāryabuddhapālitenā na varṇanīyah || (PsP<sub>M</sub> § 27, pp. 147–149)*

§ 27 consists of three parts. § 27(A) and (C) are Candrakīrti's responses to § 27(B) which is cited from Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP). To explain Nāgārjuna's thesis of that things do not arise from themselves, Buddhapālita declares it in a *prasaṅgic* way that



“Things do not arise from themselves. Because their arisings would be meaningless.” Against this statement of *prasaṅga*, Bhāviveka argues that since Buddhapālita cannot be exempt from *Sāṃkhya*’s criticism in § 27(B), Buddhapālita fails to defeat the *Sāṃkhya* opponents. With the attempt to defend Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti firstly declares in § 27(A) that as a *Mādhyamika*, Buddhapālita has no independent inference and therefore would not admit an independent probative thesis in regard to which the *Sāṃkhya* opponents could object. In § 27(C), Candrakīrti further argues that since a *Mādhyamika* would not acknowledge the reason of an independent probative inference, Buddhapālita is exempt from *Sāṃkhya*’s accusation of § 27(B).

The problematic readings of § 27(B) are marked in bold.

§ 27(B) *ko 'yaṃ pratijñārthaḥ | kiṃ kāryātmakaḥ<sup>1</sup> svata uta kāraṇātmaka<sup>2</sup> iti | kiṃ cātaḥ | kāryātmakaś<sup>3</sup> cet siddhasāadhanam | kāraṇātmakaś<sup>4</sup> ced viruddhārthatā, kāraṇātmanā vidyamānasyaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāt ||*

- 1 Q: kāryātmanah; PDBJL: kāryātmakaḥ; em. by LVP: kāryātmakāt. Tib: 'bras bu'i bdag nyid las.
- 2 Q: karaṇātmana; PDBJL: kāraṇātmaka; em. by LVP: kāraṇātmakād. Tib: rgyu'i bdag nyid las.
- 3 Q: kāryātmanah; PBJL: kāryātmakaś; D: -makeś; em. by LVP: kāryātmakāc. Tib: 'bras bu'i bdag nyid las.
- 4 Q: karaṇātmanś; PDBJL: kāraṇātmakaś; em. by LVP: kāraṇātmakāc. Tib: rgyu'i bdag nyid las.

Among the six better Sanskrit manuscripts, Q is in favor of an ablative *karmadhāraya* reading, while the other five manuscripts are in favor of a nominative *bahuvrīhi* reading. MacDonald (2003; 2008; 2015, 368) argues that Q’s reading is the result of deliberate interference, and claims that “An explicit distinction between things as effects and things as causes is, however, not made by Buddhapālita; he merely refers to things in general. Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, on the other hand, clearly distinguish the subject that arises as either an effect or a cause. Bhāviveka ... takes things as effects. ... Candrakīrti, by contrast, takes things as causes as the subject.” Since in PP Tib the last sentence of § 27(B) reads “*skye pa can thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag nyid du yod pa kho na las skye ba'i phyir*,” MacDonald reconstructs the PP Skt as “\*kāraṇātmanā vidyamānād eva,” and argues that the meaning of it should be “because all that arises arises only from something that exists with the nature of a cause,” which implies that Bhāviveka takes the subject as effects. In contrast, since PsP Tib reads “*skye ba dang ldan pa thams cad ni rgyu'i bdag nyid du yod pa kho na skye ba'i phyir*,” MacDonald argues that this implies that Candrakīrti takes the subject as



causes. Finally, MacDonald concludes that PDBJL's nominative *bahuvrīhi* reading is preferable.

However, as far as I am concerned, MacDonald's justifications all failed. Firstly, in the commentary of MMK 1.3 (PsP § 125, pp. 278–279), Candrakīrti clearly regards the causes as the subject of the thesis of non-arising. Secondly, according to Inaba (1986, 288–289), the ablative suffix *las* in PP Tib is no more than a translation of independent genitive of *vidyamānasya*, and as a result, PP Tib and PsP Tib have no essential difference in meaning. Taken together, there is no any evidence to prove that Q's reading is deliberately interfered.

In my opinion, Q's unique reading is trustworthy mainly for two reasons. Firstly, as a citation from PP, Q's reading of this passage corresponds well to PP. Secondly, the content of this passage also suggests the ablative *karmadhāraya* readings are a better choice. To criticize Buddhapālita's claim of that things do not arise from themselves (*svatas*), the *Sāṃkhya* opponent asks that what does “*svatas*” mean to Buddhapālita here. In *Sāṃkhya*'s view, if the word “*svatas*” means “from effects themselves,” then the thesis would become “things do not arise from effects themselves,” and thus would be exactly what *Sāṃkhya* School agrees with. But if it means “from causes themselves,” then thesis would become “things do not arise from causes themselves,” and thus would contradict with *Sāṃkhya*'s *satkāryavāda*. This is to say, the ablative words “*kāryātmanaḥ*” and “*kāraṇātmanaḥ*” are expected to be two possible explanations of the ablative word *svatas*. Therefore, the ablative *karmadhāraya* readings here should be superior.

### Some amendments to § 28

§ 28 (E) *ucyate, naitad evam | kiṃ kāraṇam | yasmād yo hi yam arthaṃ pratijñānīte, tena svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayāyopapattyāsāv artho 'dhigataḥ saivopapattiḥ parasmāy upadeṣṭavyā | tasmād eṣa tāvan nyāyaḥ, yat pareṇaiva svābhyupagatapratijñātārthasādhanaṃ upādeyam | sa cāyaṃ paraṃ prati hetuḥ śāntāsambhavāt svapratijñāmātrasāratayaiva kevalaṃ svapratijñātārthasādhanaṃ upādatta iti nirupapattikapakṣābhyupagamāt svātmānam evāyaṃ kevalaṃ viśaṃvādayan, na śaknoti pareṣāṃ niścayam ādhātum iti | idam evāyaṃ spaṣṭataraṃ dūṣaṇam, yad uta svapratijñātārthasādhanaśāmarthyam iti kiṃ atrānumānabādhodbhāvanayā prayojanam ||* (PsP § 28, pp. 151–152)

§ 28 consists of two parts. *Part D* uncited here is a *pūrvapakṣa* which argues that *Mādhyamikas* can adopt an inference established merely for themselves to refute oppo-



nents. Part E is Candrakīrti's response to this *pūrvapakṣa*. The problematic readings are *sa* and *svapratijñātārthasādhana* in Part E. The editorial information is as follows:

<i>sa</i>	<i>na</i> in all Skt mss.; <i>ma</i> yin in Tibetan translation
<i>svapratijñātārthasādhana</i>	svapratijñānārthamātram P; svaØm Q; om. G; svapratijñātārthamātram in all other Skt mss; <i>rang gi dam bca' ba'i don gi sgrub par byed pa</i> in Tibetan translation.

In regard to the reading of *sa* in § 28 (D), MacDonald (2000; 2015) insists that the original reading *na* in all manuscripts cannot be made to yield a contextually meaningful and satisfying sense and therefore emended *na* to *sa*, even though *sa* is unsupported neither by Sanskrit manuscripts nor by PsP Tib. Now let us examine MacDonald's reasons.

*Reason (1)*: MacDonald (2015, vol. 2, 72, n. 155) noted that *\*Lakṣaṇatīkā* (\*LT) reads *tac cāyam*. She argues that "It would seem, however, \*LT's author was in fact relying on a manuscript of the PsP that read *sa cāyam* and that \*LT's copied *sa cāyam* degenerated independently to *tac cāyam* due to scribal error and interference ..." And the note "*tasmāt pareṇaiva sva-pratijñātārthasādhanaṃ hetuḍṣṭāntādibhir upādeyaṃ na\_asmābhiḥ | atha so 'pi pare(parō) vinā hetvādibhiḥ param pratipādayiṣyati\_ity āha | tac cāyam ityādi*" in \*LT suggests the existence of *sa* in PsP.

*Reason (2)*: MacDonald (2000, 177) states that "The question remains, however, as to the precise identity of the referent of *ayam*. Clearly *ayam* cannot refer to the *Sāṅkhya*, for, depending on the scope allocated to the initial *na* (i.e. its limit being either *upādatte* or *ādihātum*), the sentence would be at the least self-contradictory, or a most unexpected and unlikely defense of the opponent. But should it be assumed that the subject is the *Mādhyamika*, we are met with an untimely and strange defense of the *Mādhyamika*'s procedure of proof, would have to accept that *asya* of the next sentence does not refer back to *ayam* of the previous, and are confronted overall with a logically unsatisfying sequence of statements."

Embedded in these seemingly simple reasons are a number of rather difficult philological and philosophical problems. Firstly, Reason (1), unsupported by any philological evidence, is no more than a hypothesis. In fact, we can also suppose an opposite hypothesis that the original *na* was copied to *ta* in \*LT due to a scribal error since *na* and *ta* may have similar forms in some Brāhmī script, and furthermore, *ta* is amended to *tac* since *ta* is impossible in grammar here. This hypothesis seems more convincing than MacDonald's one.



Secondly, Reason (2) does not hold either. If the original reading of *svapratijñātārthamātram* is not editorially amended to *svapratijñātārthasāadhanam*, the initial *na* of this sentence can be logically satisfying. Since in P, *akṣaras ta* and *na* have similar forms, it is reasonable to reckon that the reading of *svapratijñānārtha-* in P is a scribal error of *svapratijñātārtha-*. In this manner, all the Sanskrit manuscripts support the reading of *svapratijñātārthamātram*. The problem, nevertheless, is that the Tibetan translation reads *rang gi dam bca' ba'i don gi sgrub par byed pa* which can be reconstructed into *svapratijñātārthasāadhanam* just as what is adopted both by Poussin and MacDonald in their critical editions. However, PsP Tib contains several corruptions in § 28 (E) like “*di ni gzhan la gtan tshigs kyang ma yin no*” which makes no sense in the context. This reveals the Tibetan translation of the whole passage of § 28 (E) is untrustworthy. It seems that *rang gi dam bca' ba'i don gi sgrub par byed pa* is no more than an indeliberate confusion of *svapratijñātārthasāadhanam* and *svapratijñātārthamātram* among which the former occurs once just before in the same passage. If we remain the original readings of Sanskrit manuscripts, we can translate § 28 (E) as follows.

*[We would] reply: No, this is not the case. [For] what reason? Because [it is] of course [that disputant] who proposes a [certain] matter who should, with the desire to bring about certainty in others analogous to [his] own certainty, teach the other [party] exactly the reasoning by means of which [he] has come to understand this matter. Therefore this, first, is the regular procedure: Only the opponent has to employ a proof of the matter proposed [on the basis of that] which [he him]self maintains. But on account of — in the view of [his] opponent (=Mādhyamika) — the impossibility of [valid] reasons and examples, only his thesis is the core. Even though [only his thesis is the core], he does not only employ the matter he has proposed, [namely, he also employs reasons and examples]. Thus, since he maintains a proposition lacking justification, he, fooling only himself, is not able to instill certainty in [his] opponents. Just this is a very clear criticism towards him [=Sāṃkhya], namely, [he] is incapable of proving the matter he has proposed. Therefore, in this case, what is the point of bringing out the sublation by means of an inference.*

Initially, Candrakīrti declares that if someone wants to propose a certain matter, he/she has the desire to bring about certainty in others just like in himself. Since the reasons and examples what the opponents employed are unestablished for *Mādhyamikas*, only the opponents' thesis is the core. Despite of this fact, the opponents still employ reasons and examples which are doomed to be in vain. To such a degree, the opponents cannot justify their thesis and therefore are unable to instill certainty in *Mādhyamikas*. Candrakīrti be-



believes that only by pointing out this, it is enough to refute opponents, and the bringing out the sublation by means of an inference, what the *pūrvapakṣa* of § 28 is eager to advocate, is pointless.

As far as I am concerned, since the above translation fits well with Candrakīrti's thoughts, it is felicitous to retain the original readings of Sanskrit manuscripts. I will take Michael Witzel's comment on higher textual criticism as the conclusion of this paper:

A careful critic, thus, will not do away, relying merely on his/her 'genius', with all corrupt passages many of which are and will remain obscure even to the most experienced and ingenious scholars. "Solving" such problems in a facile way (*lectio facilior*) will sooner or later turn out to have been a serious mistake. One better leaves the unusual, difficult reading (*lectio difficilior*) in the text—for the benefit of future readers.

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