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- The Establishment of the Golden Urn Lottery System and Its Implementation in Tibet during the Qing Period (III)
- Vasubandhu's Commentary on the *Bhadracaryāprañidhānarāja*: A Preliminary Transcription
- The Three Kinds of Inferences Found in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*
- House of the Tibetan Gods at Feilaifeng (Part Four): Guardians of the Mongol Dynasty
- A Textual Research on the Newly Discovered Abbatial Chronicles of Bya khyung Monastery in Amdo

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# The Three Kinds of Inferences Found in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*

Wang Junqi  
(Renmin University)

## I. Introduction

The 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti is well-known for his justification for Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* argumentative method and his severe criticism toward Bhāviveka's independent probative inference (*svatantrānumāna*), which he provided in the first chapter of the *Prasannapadā* (PsP). Because of his great influence over Tibetan Buddhism, this section of the PsP has been repeatedly studied since the discovery and publication of the PsP.<sup>1</sup> However, previous studies have rarely noted that the technique utilized for his justifications and critiques is highly similar to the famous three-inferences-theory in Kuiji's (窥基) *Great Commentary on Nyāyapraveśa*, namely the inference accepted by oneself (自比量), by others (他比量), and by both (共比量).<sup>2</sup> An examination of these similarities could suggest a new approach for revealing the meaning of Candrakīrti's justifications for Buddhapālita and criticisms toward Bhāviveka.

<sup>1</sup> These studies investigated Candrakīrti's thoughts from various aspects. For instance, Yotsuya (1999) compared Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa in terms of their critique of *svatantra* reasoning. Yoshimizu (2012) investigated how Candrakīrti inherited the reasoning-for-others from Dignāga.

<sup>2</sup> As far as I know, among the preceding studies, Harada (1993) is the only one that noticed the similarities in the usage of *svaprasiddha* (自许) between Xuanzang's Inference of Consciousness-only (唯识比量) and Candrakīrti's PsP. And Harada (1993) has clearly pointed out that Candrakīrti's understanding of *svārthānumāna* is close to Xuanzang's inference accepted/acknowledged by self (自比量). But it is a pity that Harada (1993) does not systemically investigate the three-inferences-theory and Candrakīrti's thoughts.

Furthermore, Candrakīrti's words could also bridge the gap between Dignāga and the *hetuvidyā* tradition in East Asia, though Candrakīrti and his works were not known in East Asia during that age. Xuanzang (玄奘) initiated the *hetuvidyā* tradition in East Asia through his translations and lectures regarding Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* and Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa*. However, this does not mean that the *hetuvidyā* tradition closely adheres to Dignāga's ideas. Even at a glance, the great discrepancies between them, of which the three-inferences-theory is the epitome, are clear. In the *Nyāyamukha*, Dignāga established the rule of *ubhayaniścita*, which applies to any reason in any inference,<sup>3</sup> while the three-inferences-theory breaks this rule. Therefore, this theory cannot be traced back to Dignāga himself. However, Xuanzang's famous Inference of Consciousness-only (唯识比量)<sup>4</sup> and his revision of Jayasena's Inference (胜军比量)<sup>5</sup> hold the three-inferences-theory to be necessary, and according to the Chinese

<sup>3</sup> “此中宗法，唯取立论及敌论者决定同许。于同品中，有、非有等亦复如是。” (T1628.32.1 b11-12) cf. *paṅśadharmo vādiprativādinīścito grhyate... tathā sapakṣe sann asann iti ...* Katsura (1977, p.123)

<sup>4</sup> The Inference of Consciousness-only (唯识比量) is not mentioned at all in Xuanzang's biographies (大唐大慈恩寺三藏法师传/大唐故三藏玄奘法师行状/续高僧传). But in Kuiji's (窥基) *Great Commentary*, it is recorded as follows:

Now, for example, having traveled around the western regions [i.e. India,] and completed his study, the Master [Xuanzang] was to come back. At that time, King Śilāditya reigned over five Indias. He held for [him] the great non-restrictive assembly of eighteen days, and asked Master to establish [his] doctrine. He chose those learned and virtuous all over India, gathered all of them to the place of assembly, and commanded non-Buddhists and Hīnayānists to set forth [their] theories and extend [their] refutation. Master established an inference. No one at that time dared to debate against [him]. Master established the inference for consciousness-only as follows: the thesis [reads] “Truely, the well-established visual form is certainly not separate from the visual consciousness,” the reason [reads] “Because as I accept, it is included in the first three [kinds of realms] (viz., the visual faculty, visual form and visual consciousness), but not included in the visual sense (i.e. the visual faculty),” the example [reads] “Like the visual consciousness.” [The English translation relies much on Tang (2019)]

“且如大师，周游西域，学满将还。时戒日王，王五印度，为设十八日无遮大会，令大师立义，遍诸天竺，简选贤良，皆集会所。遣外道、小乘竞申论诘，大师立量。时人无敢对扬者。大师立唯识比量云，真故极成色不离于眼识宗，自许初三摄眼所不摄故因，犹如眼识喻。” (T1840.44.115b21-27)

<sup>5</sup> Jināsena's Inference for Mahāyāna and Xuanzang's revision are recorded as follows:

[Jināsena had considered] for about forty years and finally established the inference as follows: the thesis [reads] “All of the Mahāyāna Sūtras are the words of Buddha,” the reason [reads] “Because as established to both the proponent and the opponent, it is not included in the words of someone other than Buddha,” the example [reads] “like the Ekottarāgama.” [Jināsena's] commentary is recorded in [his] \**Vijñaptimātraviniścaya*. The [reason] that “Because as established to both the proponent and the opponent, it is not included in the words of someone other than Buddha”, namely “as accepted by both the proponent and the opponent, it is not included in the words of someone other than Buddha”, means “it is not included by the words of heretics and the Six Feet [Śāstras of Sarvāstivāda School].” [This proof of Jināsena] had prevailed for a long time and no one dared to refute. Master [Xuanzang] reached him and refuted... Based on this, Master [Xuanzang] revised the reason [of Jināsena's proof] as follows: “Because as accepted and established by [Mahāyāna] itself, it is not included in the words of someone other than Buddha.” [This revised reason] excludes the *Jñānaprasthāna* for it is not accepted by [Mahāyāna] itself. Thus there would be no such mistake.

“四十余年，立一比量，云。诸大乘经皆佛说，宗。两俱极成非诸佛语所不摄故，因。如增一等阿笈摩，喻。注在唯识决择中。两俱极成非佛语所不摄者，立敌共许非佛语所不摄，即非外道及六足等教之所摄故。时久流行，无敢征诘。大师至彼，而难之曰……由此大师正彼因云。自许极成非佛语所不摄故。简彼发智等非自许故。便无兹失。” (Ibid.121b20-c13)

materials, these two inferences were proposed by Xuanzang in India. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to conjecture that Xuanzang must have learned this theory during his journey in India, and thus, this theory may have an Indian origin.

But who is the origin of this theory? This question forced us to investigate texts by other “unorthodox” Buddhist logicians, including Bhāviveka, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti. The former two Buddhist philosophers were well-known in ancient East Asia because of their famous debate regarding emptiness and existence. However, none of their texts seem to explain this theory in detail. In this respect, however, Candrakīrti proves useful. Therefore, Candrakīrti’s texts are crucial for illustrating the process by which this theory developed from Dignāga into the complicated system illustrated in Kuiji’s *Great Commentary*. It helps to reveal some new clues for understanding the development process timeline between Dignāga’s logic and the *hetuvidyā* tradition in East Asia.

This paper aims to analyze Candrakīrti’s related passages using the three-inferences-theory in order to reveal why Candrakīrti abandoned Dignāga’s rigid requirement of “common acceptance” (*ubhayaniścita*, *ubhayaprasiddhi*) for an inference and to elaborate Candrakīrti’s thoughts regarding the three inferences by proving these five propositions about the PsP:

1. The inference accepted by oneself and by others are adopted by Candrakīrti, while the names of these two inferences are still unsettled.
2. The inference accepted by both (共比量) is rejected by Candrakīrti.
3. The inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) is equated with the inference accepted by oneself (自比量), and it can function merely as a right proof (能立).
4. Buddhapāli’s *prasaṅga* argumentative method is reinterpreted as an inference accepted by others (他比量). Furthermore, only the inference accepted by others can be a right refutation (能破).
5. Qualification/Qualifying words (*viśeṣaṇa* 简别语), typical features of the three-inferences-theory, are frequently witnessed in the PsP.

## II. The three-inferences-theory in Kuiji’s *Great Commentary*

According to Dignāga’s *Nyāyamukha*, a *liṅga* should fulfill the rule of *ubhayaniścita*.

**Material A:** 此中宗法，唯取立论及敌论者决定同许。于同品中，有、非有等亦复如是<sup>6</sup>……唯有共许决定言词，说名能立、或名能破，非互不成、犹豫言

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *paśadharmo vādiprativādinīścito grhyate...* PVV [Sāṅkrtyāyana 1938-1940, 293] *tathā sapakṣe sann asann ...* See Katsura [1977, 123]

词, 复待成故。<sup>7</sup> (T1628.32.1b11-12)

*Here, it is cognized that [the reason as being] the property of its possessor is ascertained by both the proponents and the opponents. In the same way, [the reason] existing in similar instances or not [should also be ascertained by both sides] ... Only [the words] expressing [the reason] that has been ascertained by both sides can be a right proof or a right refutation, but the [words] expressing [the reason] accepted by one side or doubtful cannot.*

According to this statement, a “right reason” should be ascertained or accepted by both the proponents and the opponents. Since a right reason being the property of the subject, should exist in similar instances and not exist in dissimilar instances, the subject, the similar instances, and the dissimilar instances all should be ascertained by both the proponents and the opponents. Therefore, the rule of *ubhayaniścita* concerns not only the right reason, but also all the other elements in a syllogism except the probandum (*sādhyā*).

However, people from different schools tend to hold conflicting opinions regarding the reasons and so on, so it is almost impossible for them to finally achieve mutual consent with regard to the reasons and the other elements of a syllogism. Therefore, in a real debate, the rule of *ubhayaniścita* is too strict to be fulfilled. In order to reconcile this rule with the actuality of debates, the *Great Commentary* makes the following recommendation:

**Material B:** 问: “既两共许, 何故不名共成, 而言极成?” 答: “……又因明法有自比量及他比量能立能破。若言共成应无有此。” (T1840.44.99c14-17)

*Question: Now that [the property-possessor and its qualifier] are accepted by both sides, why are they called “well-established” but not “equally established”?*

*Answer: In addition, according to the principle of hetuvidyā, there are inferences accepted by oneself (自比量) as right proofs (能立) and inferences accepted by others (他比量) as right refutations (能破). If “equally established” was stated, there would be no such [two kinds of inferences].*

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *ya eva tūbhayaniścītavācī sa sādhanam, dūṣaṇam vā, nānyataraprasiddhasandigdhavācī, punaḥ sādhanāpekṣatvād iti* | PVSV [Gnoli 1960, 153]

cf. *ya eva tūbhayaviniścītavācī, sa sādhanam dūṣaṇam vā, nānyataraprasiddhasandigdhavācīti...* PsP [Macdonald 2015a, 190]

A similar statement is found in PS 3.11: *dvayoḥ siddhena dharmeṇa vyavahārād viparyaye | dvayor ekasya sandehe dharmyasiddhau ca neṣyate* || This verse is cited by Prajñākaragupta in his commentary of Dharmakīrti's *Pramānavārttika*.

To explain why Xuanzang intentionally translated the word *prasiddha* into “well established,” even though its meaning in the original context could be accurately translated as “equally established,” Kuiji introduced the three-inferences-theory. According to him, if the word *prasiddha* only means “equally established,” this would disqualify the inferences accepted by oneself and by others. Therefore, Kuiji concludes that the word *prasiddha* has to mean “well established.”<sup>8</sup> Thus, through this deliberate translation and interpretation, Xuanzang and Kuiji explored a new dimension of the three-inferences-theory for the *hetuvidyā* tradition in East Asia.

Unlike Dignāga’s theory of inferences, the three-inferences-theory allows for disobedience to the rule of *ubhayaniścita*. Kuiji argues as follows:

*Material C:* 凡因明法，若自比量，宗、因、喻中皆须依自。他、共亦尔。立依自、他、共，敌对亦须然，名善因明，无疎谬矣。(T1840.44.116a22-24)

*According to the principles of hetuvidyā, in the case of “inference accepted by oneself,” the thesis, the reason and the example should all be based on one’s own [doctrines]. This is also the case for “[inference accepted by] others” and “[inference accepted] by both”. Because [a proponent]*

<sup>8</sup> But in fact, when explaining Xuanzang’s Inference of Consciousness-only, Kuiji treats “jicheng” (极成, \**prasiddha*) as opposing to “zixu” (自许, accepted by self). He argues as follows:

*The phrase “jicheng” (\*prasiddha) [qualifying the subject “visual form”] is to exclude [from its realm the visual forms that only] various Hīnayāna schools [accept, like] the defiled forms of the Bodhisattva [Śākyamuni] in his last lifetime [before entering into nirvāṇa], and all the tainted forms of Buddha’s body. If [we] establish [such forms] to be only consciousness, there will be [the fault] that one part of the qualificand (viśeṣya), [i.e., the subject,] is not established by the proponent, and also be the fault that one part [of the subject which is admitted to include these forms] is contradicted by [the proponent’s own] doctrine. [On the other hand,] the forms of the Buddhas in all the ten directions and the untainted form of Buddha are not accepted by the opponents, [i.e. Hīnayāna scholars,] to be existent. If [we] establish [such visual forms] to be only consciousness, there will be [the fault] that one part of the qualificand is not established by the opponent. [Moreover,] the two reasons [, one of which is to establish the set of forms which, besides forms that are well established, also includes forms that only the opponent accepts, and the other is to establish another set which, besides forms that are well established, also includes forms that only the proponent accepts,] will both have [the fault that] one part of the substratum [i.e. the subject of the reason-statement] is not established by one of the two parties [in debate, i.e. by either the proponent or the opponent]. [We] state the phrase “well established” in order to exclude these [faults], because [we have specified through this qualification] what [we are to] establish to be only consciousness are those equally accepted forms apart from the [above] two [unaccepted kinds].*

“极成”之言，简诸小乘后身菩萨染污诸色、一切佛身有漏诸色。若立为唯识，便有一分自所别不成，亦有一分违宗之失。十方佛色及佛无漏色，他不许有。立为唯识，有他一分所别不成。其此二因，皆有随一分所依不成。说“极成”言，为简于此，立二所余共许诸色为唯识故。(T1840.44.115c8-14)

Kuiji mentions that in this case the word “jicheng” (极成, \**prasiddha*) means “accepted by both sides” (共许). This shows the tension of the meaning of the word “极成” in Kuiji’s *Great Commentary*. But I do not regard this tension as Kuiji’s inconsistency. Because in the NPr, the PsP and other texts, *prasiddha* sometimes means “equally accepted”, but sometimes only means “accepted by one side”. Macdonald (2015a, §28, p. 149).



has based his demonstration on either his own [theory], or the opponent's [theory], or [the theory] common to both, the opponent should also refute it in the corresponding manner, [i.e., base his refutation on either the proponent's theory, his own theory, or the theory common to both]. [Conducting a debate in this manner] could be called being well-versed in *Hetuvidyā* and free from carelessness and errors.

It is no longer necessary to obey the strict rule of *ubhayaniścita*, and a proponent or opponent can freely propose an inference as long as its thesis, reason, and example are consistently accepted by a given side. Furthermore, depending on who accepts all these elements of a given syllogism, inferences can be classified into three kinds: the inference accepted by oneself, by others and by both; each of these is considered to be a right proof or a right refutation. Kuiji holds this theory to be so important that he states that only a person who is familiar with it can be said to be well-versed in *hetuvidyā*.

Furthermore, Kuiji's *Great Commentary* integrates this theory with the other aspects of *hetuvidyā* and finally develops it into a complicated system. For example, when a given reason appears to be unestablished to either the proponent or the opponent (*anyatarāsiddha*), it can be corrected by adding the qualifications/qualifying words (*viśeṣaṇa* 簡別語) of "accepted by oneself" (自許) or "accepted by others" (他許). Furthermore, in the case of inconclusive reasons (*anaikāntika*), when a given reason is existing in both similar instances and dissimilar instances, it is said to be "commonly inconclusive" (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*). Since there are three standpoints for judging whether a given reason is commonly inconclusive, namely, from that of oneself, of others and of both sides, and the inference itself could be originally accepted by oneself, by others, or by both, the commonly inconclusive reason (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*) can be divided into nine kinds. Moreover, this division can also be applied to the other five kinds of inconclusive reasons, and there are therefore 54 kinds of inconclusive reasons.

### III. The three kinds of inferences found in the *Prasannapadā*

Unlike the complex illustration of the three-inferences-theory found in Kuiji's *Great Commentary*, the first chapter of Candrakīrti's PsP exhibits a rudimentary version of the theory. As mentioned above, this paper aims to prove the following presuppositions.

**Presupposition 1) The inference accepted by oneself and by others are adopted by Candrakīrti, while the names of these two inferences are still unsettled.**

In the first chapter of the PsP, Candrakīrti mentions "the inference established by both

sides" (*ubhayasiddhena vānumānena*<sup>9</sup>). This concurs well with Dignāga's rule of *ubhayaniścita*. For this reason, we can equate it with the so-called "inference accepted by both" (共比量) in Kuiji's *Great Commentary*. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to suppose that *ubhayasiddha-anumāna* could be one of the possible Sanskrit names for "共比量."

However, in the PsP, the names of the inferences accepted by oneself (自比量) and by others (他比量) are still undecided. For example, *svata evānumāna* (§28, p. 150), *svato 'numāna* (§30, p. 158), and *svābhyupagamapratijñātārthasādhana* (§28, p. 151), which Candrakīrti frequently mentions, are not equivalent to the inference accepted by oneself (自比量) at all. Sometimes the word *sva* refers to the proponents, and at other times, it refers to the opponents. Similarly, the word *para* can also refer to any side of a given debate.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, unlike Kuiji, who strictly uses the words "自" (*\*sva*) and "他" (*\*para*), Candrakīrti uses them quite randomly.

### Presupposition 2) The inference accepted by both (共比量) is rejected by Candrakīrti.

Both Dignāga and Kuiji admitted "the inference accepted by both". While Candrakīrti criticized Bhāviveka's independent inference, and through this criticism, he rejected the independent inference, which relied on the agreement regarding the ontological state of things between *Mādhyamikas* and their realist opponents. In order to prove Nāgārjuna's thesis of non-arising (*anutpāda*), Bhāviveka constructed the famous independent inference<sup>11</sup> as follows:

<sup>9</sup> Macdonald (2015a, §28, pp. 149-150).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. §58-60, pp. 189-191.

<sup>11</sup> *na paramārthata ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāc caitanyavat* || PsP (Ibid, §39, pp.167-168)

This paper extracts Bhāviveka's independent inference from Candrakīrti's citation in the PsP rather than Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, because the aim of this paper is to investigate Candrakīrti's thoughts and how he understands Bhāviveka's inference. But on account of the close relationship between Bhāviveka and Xuanzang, it has to be admitted that the person who has really influenced Xuanzang's "Inference of Consciousness-only" and the *hetuvidyā* tradition in East Asia is not Candrakīrti, but Bhāviveka. I will discuss this topic in future studies. Here briefly speaking, Xuanzang adopts the qualification or qualifying words "真故" (*\*tattatas*) from Bhāviveka. And according to Ejima (1980, 189-192), Bhāviveka regards this inference as an inference accepted by both, even though Candrakīrti considers this an inference accepted by self without the ability to refute others. Kuiji also states Xuanzang's Inference of Consciousness-only is an inference accepted by both. Thus, Bhāviveka and Xuanzang's inferences shared many similarities. Zenju (善珠)'s 因明论疏明灯抄 quoted Master Bin (宾法师)'s opinion that Xuanzang's Inference of Consciousness-only inherited directly from Bhāviveka.

*Master Bin said that now when examining Tripitaka Master [Xuanzang]'s Proof [of Consciousness-only], [we can find that] the start of [this proof] imitates [Bhāviveka's] \*Hastaratna, the main portion looks like Vijñaptimātratā[siddhi]. Because, as \*Karatalaratna says "Truely, conditioned things are empty", here [the Inference of Consciousness-only also] says "truely".*

宾法师云，今详三藏此量，头放(should be 仿)掌珍，身像唯识。如掌珍云，真性有为空故今言真故也。(T2270.68.0319a02-04)

*Pakṣa* Ultimately, the internal bases have not arisen from self.

*Hetu* Because they are already existing.

*Dṛṣṭānta* Like consciousness. (MacDonald 2015b, §39, p. 92)

However, Candrakīrti made a criticism that this inference would be illegal, since its qualification/qualifying word of “ultimately” makes no sense.

**Material D:** Moreover, if this qualification is employed by [Bhāviveka because] he wants to rule out a negation of arising on the surface [level], then there would be the fault of the proposition, [namely, that the proposition is] unestablished with respect to [its] locus from [his] own [point of view], or the fault of the reason, [namely, that the reason is] unestablished as regards [its] basis [from his own point of view], because the bases—the faculty of vision, etc. —are not ultimately accepted from [Bhāviveka’s] own [side].

If [Bhāviveka replies that] there is no fault because the visual faculty, etc., exist on the surface [level], [we pose the question:] This [word] “ultimately,” then, [serves as] a qualification for what?

If [Bhāviveka argues that] because the arising of the surface [level] visual faculty, etc. is negated from the ultimate point of view, “ultimately” is used as a qualification for the negation of arising, [we respond:] Then [this being] the case, it has to be stated exactly thus, viz., “Ultimately, there is not the arising of the surface [level] visual faculty, etc.”; but [your inference] is not stated in this way. Even if it were formulated [in this way], owing to the fact that the opponent maintains that the visual faculty, etc., indeed exist substantially and does not accept that [these bases merely] exist by designation, there would be, from the opponent’s side, the fault of the proposition [namely, that the proposition is] unestablished with respect to its locus. Thus, this [justification

for the qualification] is not reasonable.<sup>12</sup> PsP Chap.1 §45-47 (MacDonald 2015b, pp.100-103)

This critique toward Bhāviveka is focusing on the what the word “ultimately” is qualifying. If the word “ultimately” was qualifying the *pakṣadharmin*, namely the internal bases, then the thesis would be stated as follows: “The ultimate internal bases have not arisen from themselves.” However, from the point of view of *Mādhyamikas*, the internal bases only exist on the surface level. This means that Bhāviveka himself would not consider “the ultimate internal bases” as being established. Thus, unavoidably, there would be the fault of the proposition (*pakṣadoṣa*), namely, that the proposition is unestablished with respect to its locus, and the fault of the reason (*hetudoṣa*), namely, that the reason is unestablished with regard to its basis from the standpoint of Bhāviveka.

However, if the word “ultimately” was qualifying “non-arising”, the thesis would be as follows: “The conventional internal bases are not ultimately arising.” Since realist opponents admit that the internal bases exist substantially, they do not consider the *pakṣadharmin* as being established. Therefore, there would also be the same fault of the proposition (*pakṣadoṣa*) and the same fault of the reason (*hetudoṣa*) from the standpoint of realist opponents of *Mādhyamikas*.

Thus, we could conclude that, in Candrakīrti’s point of view, since the realist opponents and *Mādhyamikas* could never reach an agreement regarding the state of beings—that is, what is ultimately accepted by the realist opponents is rejected by *Mādhyamikas*, and similarly, what is conventionally accepted by *Mādhyamikas* is rejected by the realist opponents, it is not possible for an inference accepted by both (共

<sup>12</sup>*api ca yadi samvṛtyotpattiṣedhanirācīkīrṣuṇā viśeṣaṇam etad upādīyate, tadā svato 'siddhādhāraḥ pakṣadoṣa āśrayāsiddho vā hetudoṣaḥ syāt, paramārthataḥ svataś cakṣurādyāyatanānām anabhyupagamāt || samvṛtyā cakṣurādīsadbhāvād adoṣa iti cet, paramārthata ity etat tarhi kasya viśeṣaṇam || sāmṛtānām cakṣurādīnām paramārthata utpattiṣedhād utpattiṣedhaviśeṣaṇam paramārthagrahaṇam iti cet, evaṃ tarhy evam eva vaktavyaṃ syāt-- sāmṛtānām cakṣurādīnām paramārthato nāsty utpattir iti | na caivam ucyate | ucyamāne 'pi parair dravyasatām eva cakṣurādīnām abhyupagamāt prajñaptisatām cānabhyupagamāt parato 'siddhādhāraḥ pakṣadoṣaḥ syād iti na yuktam etat || MacDonald (2015a, §45-47, pp. 171-173)*

Not only did Candrakīrti notice the problematic qualification “ultimately” (*paramārthataś*) in Bhāviveka’s previous inference, but Hossōshū’s (法相宗) monks also noticed almost the same and debated on what is qualified by the qualification “\**tattatas*” (真故) in Bhāviveka’s another inference “Truely, conditioned things are empty” (真故有为空) in his \**Karataratna* (掌珍论). For example, Zan, an (漸安 or 渐安), a monk belonging to the North Temple school of Japanese Hossōshū, hold the opinion that the qualification “\**tattatas*” (真故) is qualifying the *pakṣadharmin*, namely the “conditioned things”. Professor Moro has listed and illustrated the different ideas of Hossōshū’s (法相宗) monks on this problem. See Moro (2015, pp. 164-165).

But of course different with the Hossōshū’s (法相宗) monks, Candrakīrti’s final purpose is to criticize Bhāviveka’s arbitrary use of the qualification.

比量) to emerge.

**Presupposition 3) The inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) is equated with the inference accepted by oneself (自比量), and it can function merely as a right proof (能立).**

Candrakīrti cited Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* and then criticized Dignāga's rule of *ubhayaniścita*. His argument was as follows:

**Material E:** And exactly on account of this certain [scholars] have stated, "There is not sublation by inference due to acknowledgement from the side of the other (= the proponent) because it is precisely the acknowledgement of the other [party] (=the opponent) that is sought to be refuted."

But he (=Dignāga) who considers that "Only that [reason], however, which expresses what is ascertained for both [parties in the debate amounts to] proof / a proving element or refutation / a refuting element, not [one] expressing doubt or what is established for [merely] one of the two [parties]," also ought to accept, in accordance with worldly establishment, the procedure exactly as it has been stated [above by me]. For, similarly, sublation by authoritative testimony is not exclusively [effected] by authoritative testimony that is acknowledged by both [parties]. Rather, [it is generally accepted that sublation can be effected] aslo by [authoritative testimony] acknowledged [only] by [one]self [i.e., only by the party whose view is being critiqued]. As regards inference for oneself, on the other hand, in all cases just [one's] own acknowledgement is weightier, not the acknowledgement of both [parties]. Precisely on account of this [fact that in each of the above situations it is this own acknowledgement that is the essential factor, not the acknowledge of both parties], the stating of [technical] definitions pertaining to logic is useless ...<sup>13</sup>

PsP Chap.1 §58-60 (MacDonald 2015b, pp. 136-138)

Here, Candrakīrti classifies two situations regarding the application of inferences. In cases involving the refutation of others, the inferences accepted/acknowledged by both sides or merely by others (=opponents) should be applied. Furthermore,

<sup>13</sup> *ata eva ca kaiścīd uktam-- na parataḥ prasiddhivaśād anumānabādhā, parasiddher eva nirācīkīrṣitatvād iti | yas tu manyate-- ya eva tūbhayaviniścītavācī, sa sādhanam dūṣaṇam vā, nānyataraprasiḍḍhasamdigdhavācīti, tenāpi laukikīm vyavasthām anurudhyamānena yathokta eva nyāyo 'bhyupeyaḥ || tathā hi -- nobhayaprasiddhenaivāgamenāgamabādhā | kiṃ tarhi svaprasiddhenāpi | svārthānumāne tu sarvatra svaprasiddhir eva garīyasī, nobhayaprasiddhiḥ | ata eva tarkalakṣaṇābhīdhānam niḥprayojanam... §58-60, pp. 189-191.*

since Candrakīrti has already negated the inference accepted by both (共比量), only the inference accepted by others can function as an efficient refutation. In cases involving the establishment of one's own thesis, namely, the inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*), however, only one's own acknowledgement is essential.

Obviously, Candrakīrti's understanding regarding the inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) differed greatly from that of Dignāga. According to Dignāga's texts, the only difference between *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* is that the former is essentially a kind of knowledge and that the latter is a verbal expression of the former. For example, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 3.1ab says the following:

**Material F:** *parārtham anumānaṃ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśanam* | PS  
(Katsura 2009, 157)

In *svavṛtti*, he says,

**Material G:** *ji ltar rang gi tshul gsum pavi rtags las rtags can gyi shes pa skyes pa de bzhin du gzhan la rtags can gyi shes pa bskyed par vdod nas tshul gsum pavi rtags brjod pa ni gzhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste* | PS  
(Vasudhararakṣita) Derge 4204, 40b1-2

Based on the reason having triple characters, the [knower] himself would have the knowledge of [the probandum] that has the reason (\*liṅgin). In the same way, in order to let others know [the probandum] which has the reason (\*liṅgin), the statement of the reason having triple characters is the inference for others (*parārthānumāna*).

Compared with Dignāga, Candrakīrti, who totally disregards the above-provided definitions, equates the inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) with the inference accepted by oneself (自比量); furthermore, he states that its only function is to establish one's own thesis and that it lacks the ability to refute others. This is almost similar to Kuiji's famous statement: "In the principles of *hetuvidyā*, the inference accepted by oneself functions as a right proof, and the inference accepted by others functions as a right refutation"<sup>14</sup>.

**Presupposition 4) Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* argumentative method is reinterpreted as an inference accepted by others (他比量). Furthermore, only the inference accepted by others can be a right refutation (能破).**

Candrakīrti argues that only an inference accepted by others can refute opponents'

<sup>14</sup> “因明法有自比量及他比量能立、能破。” (T1840.44.99c16-17)

thesis as follows:

**Material H:** This fault occurs for those voicing an independent inference. We do not employ an independent inference, because our inferences result in the negation of the opponent's thesis. To explain: The opponent considers that the visual faculty sees. He is rebuffed by way of an inference acknowledged exclusively by him[self] : [Mādhyamika:] You maintain that the visual faculty has the property of not seeing itself, and it is accepted that [the property of not seeing oneself] is invariably connected with the property of not seeing [what is] other [than oneself]. Therefore, [Exemplification:] Wherever there is not the seeing of oneself there is also not the seeing of [what is] other [than oneself], as in the case of a pot, [which does not see itself or what is other than itself]. [Application:] And [it] is [a fact that] the visual faculty does not see itself; [Conclusion:] Therefore, it also certainly does not see [what is] other [than itself]. And thus the seeing of [what is] other [than itself], such as blue, etc., since it is contradicted by not seeing itself, is controverted by way of an inference acknowledged exclusively by [him]self.<sup>15</sup> PsP Chap.1 §56 (MacDonald 2015b, pp. 130-133)

In order to refute the realist opponents, Candrakīrti admitted the inference accepted/acknowledged by others and constructed the above-provided inference as an example to illustrate how this kind of inference can refute opponents. As we can see, both its invariable concomitance and its reason are acknowledged exclusively by the opponents, and it was unnecessary for Candrakīrti himself to make any commitment to any single element of this inference. Finally, an undesired conclusion for the realist opponents is deduced from the invariable concomitance and the reason. Candrakīrti believed that, in this way, this inference could controvert the opponents' thesis. Obviously, the inference acknowledged exclusively by the opponents, which was adopted by Candrakīrti here, is the same with the "inference accepted by others" (他比量) in the three-inferences-theory.

As to Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga*, Candrakīrti, similarly, restored it to an inference accepted/acknowledged by others. When explaining "non-arising," Buddhapālita said,

<sup>15</sup> *ucyate-- svatantram anumānaṃ bruvatām ayaṃ doṣo jāyate | na vayaṃ svatantram anumānaṃ prayuñjmahe parapratiññāniṣedhaphalatvād asmādanumānānām | tathā hi-- paraś caḥṣuḥ paśyatīti pratipannaḥ | sa tatprasiddhenaivānumānena nirākriyate-- caḥṣuḥ svātmādarśanadharmam icchasi parādarśanadharmāvinābhāvītvam cāṅgīkṛtam, tasmād yatra yatra svātmādarśanam, tatra tatra paradarśanam api nāsti, tad yathā ghaṭe | asti ca caḥṣuḥ svātmādarśanam, tasmāt paradarśanam apy asya naivāsti | tataś ca svātmādarśanaviruddhaṃ nīlādiparadarśanam svaprasiddhenaivānumānena vīrudhyata iti || §56, pp. 186-188.*

“Things do not arise from self. Because their arising [from self] is meaningless.”<sup>16</sup> Literally, “things do not arise from self” is the thesis, and “because their arising [from self] is meaningless” is the reason. However, Candrakīrti did not confine his explanation to a literal reading of Buddhapālita’s statement, and he rewrote it into a five-membered inference:

- Thesis: [Things disposed to arise such as] a pot, etc., at the stage of a lump of clay, etc., do not require re-arising,  
Reason: because they [already] exist by own nature;  
Example: that which [already] exist by [its] own nature is observed not to require re-arising, like [a thing] such as a pot situated in front, which is [already] existing;  
Application: and similarly, [things disposed to arise such as] a pot, etc., at the stage of a lump of clay, etc., [already] exist by own nature;  
Conclusion: therefore, because they [already] exist by own nature, [things disposed to arise, such as] a pot, etc., at the stage of a lump of clay, etc., do not require re-arising.<sup>17</sup> (MacDonald 2015b, p. 80, n. 173)

As the same, because Candrakīrti argued that the above-provided reason, the invariable concomitance and so on are exclusively accepted by *Sāṃkhyas*, this five-membered inference is an “inference accepted/acknowledged by others” (他比量). This explanation is crucial for revealing the fact that, even though both Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti are regarded as *\*Prāsaṅgikas*, they differ methodologically. Buddhapālita uses the *prasaṅga* argumentative method only, while Candrakīrti converts *prasaṅga* into an inference accepted/acknowledged by others (他比量), and furthermore, he argues that only such an inference could lead opponents to contradictory conclusions, and, consequently, refute them. Furthermore, this implies that, except for Dignāga’s theories, some non-Dignāga-related theories, such as the three-inferences-theory, have

<sup>16</sup> *na svata utpadyante bhāvās, tadutpādavaiyarthyād...* §29, p. 153.

<sup>17</sup> *so 'py udbhāvita evācāryabuddhapālitenā, na svata utpadyante bhāvās, tadutpādavaiyarthyād iti vacanāt | atra hi tad ity anena svātmanā vidyamānasya parāmarśaḥ | tathā hy asya grahaṇakavākyasyaitad vivaraṇavākyam, na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām punarutpāde prayojanam iti | anena ca vākyena sādhyasādhanadharmānugatasya paraprāsiddhasya sādharmyadr̥ṣṭāntasyopādānam | tatra svātmanā vidyamānasyety anena hetuparāmarśaḥ | utpādavaiyarthyād ity anena sādhyadharmaparāmarśaḥ ||... iha svātmanā vidyamānaṃ puro 'vasthitam ghaṭādikam punarutpādānapekṣam dr̥ṣṭam | tathā ca mṛtipiṇḍādyavasthāyām api yadi svātmanā vidyamānaṃ ghaṭādikam iti manyase, tadāpi tasya svātmanā vidyamānasya nāsty utpāda iti || evaṃ svātmanā vidyamānatvenopanayābhivyaktena punarutpādapratīṣed hāvyabhicāriṇā hetunā svata eva Sāṃkhyasyānumānavirodhobhāvanam anuṣṭhitam eveti | tat kim ucyate, tad ayuktaṃ hetudr̥ṣṭāntānabhidhānād iti || §29, pp. 153-157.*



also profoundly influenced Candrakīrti.

**Presupposition 5) Qualification/Qualifying words (*viśeṣaṇa* 简别语), typical features of the three-inferences-theory, are frequently witnessed in the PsP.**

The qualification or the qualifying words (*viśeṣaṇa* 简别语) are a typical feature of the three-inferences-theory. Kuiji's *Great Commentary* also features frequent use of some qualifications/qualifying words.

The inference accepted by oneself (自比量)	我、许、自许、我立此意、如我所言
The inference accepted by others (他比量)	汝执、汝、执、他许、所言
The inference accepted by both (共比量)	胜义、真、真性 <sup>18</sup>

In the PsP, we can also find some similar qualifications.

1) Qualifications of the thesis.

a. §28, p. 150, *svata eva pakṣahetudrṣṭāntadoṣarahitaiḥ pakṣādibhir*

b. §28, p. 151, *tasmād eṣa tāvan nyāyo, yat pareṇaiva svābhyupagamapratijñātārt hasādhanam upādeyam*

c. §32, p. 159, *atha vāyam anyañ prayogamārgaḥ--puruṣavyatiriktāḥ padārthāḥ svata utpattivādināḥ tata eva na svata utpadyante, svātmanā vidyamānatvāt, puruṣavat, itīdam udāharaṇam udāhāryam ||*

2) Qualifications of the reason.

d. §50, pp. 180-181, *yataś caivaṃ svayam evāmunā nyāyena hetor asiddhir aṅgīkṛtānena, tasmāt sarveṣv evānumāneṣu vastudharmopanyastahetukeṣu svata eva hetvādīnām asiddhatvāt sarvāṇy eva sādhanāni vyāhanyatte |*

3) Qualifications of the example.

e. §29, p. 154, *paraprasiddhasya sādharmyadrṣṭāntasya*

<sup>18</sup> Kuiji considers Xuanzang's Inference of Consciousness-only is an inference accepted by both and the word 真故 (\**tattvatas*) in this inference is the qualification of the inference accepted by both. He said as follows:

To [form] an inference accepted by both and so on, [if the inference] is qualified with the words "from the standpoint of ultimate truth" and so on, then [such an inference] can avoid committing the fault that [the thesis is] contradicted by common knowledge or by one's own tradition, etc... [We] state the phrase "well established" in order to exclude these [faults], because [we have specified through this qualification] what [we are to] establish to be only consciousness are those equally accepted forms apart from the [above] two [unaccepted kinds].

若共比量等，以“胜义”言简，无违世间、自教等失……说“极成”言，为简于此，立二所余共许诸色为唯识故。(T1840.44.115c2-3, 13-14)

Compared to Kuiji, Candrakīrti used less qualifications and did not mention that the qualifications could be used to revise wrong proofs at all, as witnessed in Kuiji's *Great Commentary*. This does not mean that Candrakīrti was more prudent than Kuiji in his using of the three-inferences-theory. The most reasonable explanation for why Candrakīrti used the qualifications less frequently is as follows: during Candrakīrti's era, this theory was still in its early stages, and its many functions had not been fully developed yet.

#### IV. Conclusion

In this paper, I attempted to prove five suppositions about Candrakīrti's inference theory. Furthermore, I provided a new approach for understanding Candrakīrti's justifications for Buddhapālita and criticisms toward Bhāviveka using the famous three-inferences-theory in the *hetuvidyā* tradition in East Asia.

In conclusion, it can be said that just like Kuiji, Candrakīrti also divided inferences into three kinds: the inference accepted by oneself, by others and by both, and he admitted that the inference accepted by oneself can work as a right proof and the inference accepted by others as a right refutation. However, different with Dignāga and Kuiji, Candrakīrti denies the inference accepted by both based on his *Madhyamaka* position. This discovery, while helping us to better understand Candrakīrti's thought, also provides historical clues to the development of the three-inferences-theory.

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## 月称《明句论》中的自他共比量

王浚淇

摘要: 活跃于公元六七世纪的印度中观派论师月称, 在《明句论》一书中, 批评了清辩论师所采用的自立比量。其中, 月称所用技巧与汉传因明“自他共”三比量之说非常接近。对比此二者, 可以为我们理解月称思想与汉传因明的起源提供有益的视角与材料。文章在分析月称《明句论》梵文本的基础上, 着重考察“自他共”三比量说视角下月称思想的样态, 进而得出如下结论: 月称归谬论法的核心是“他比量”; 他认为清辨的自立比量只是一种“自比量”, 不具备能破的功能; 月称所用技巧更为质朴、简洁, 与汉传因明中的三比量说的复杂形成了鲜明对比。因此, 月称之说可能代表了三比量说发展的较早阶段, 为我们了解三比量说乃至汉传因明的起源和发展提供了珍贵的原始资料。

关键词: 月称; 明句论; 自他共比量; 因明